Benoni Stinson's First Speech on the Second Proposition.
STINSON'S FIRST ADDRESSON THE SECOND PROPOSITION.
PROPOSITION SECOND.
"That man is a moral agent, endowed with the volition of free will, capable of choosing or refusing eternal salvation as it is proposed in the gospel."
MR. STINSON--
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: The proposition has been read and is our text for this afternoon. It supposes that eternal salvation is offered. That fact we have attempted to establish in our arguments in the evidence of the first proposition. How far we have succeeded will be for the public to determine. But supposing an humble effort in that direction has been somewhat successful, we now rise again, as before, burdened with the affirmative. That man is a moral agent, endowed with the volition of free will, capable of choosing or refusing eternal salvation, as it is proposed to him in the gospel. Lest there may be a difference of sentiment between Brother Hume and myself on the subject of the understanding of the meaning of moral agency, free will, etc., I thought it best to settle the definition of the terms, as far as it could be settled, at the commencement of the debate upon this question. Webster defines the term agent as meaning an actor--one that exerts power, or has power to act for another--active power or calling. "Moral agent," is a term used theologically and has reference to the powers of the mind to act in a moral sense. I will now read the definition of will: "That faculty of the mind by which we determine either to do or forbear doing an action." In other words, to do or not to do. There is a point here I would call the attention of the audience to. The words "moral agent" and "freedom of the will," are so nearly synonymous that had we been a little more careful, they need not both have been inserted in the proposition. Whatever point of scripture will establish the one, will also establish the other. This morning and yesterday we investigated the subject of man's redemption. The subject was introduced in all its bearings, with regard to the economy of redemption, as revealed in the Bible. We have now to investigate the character of man, to ascertain whether man possesses the power to act or refuse to act--to choose or not to choose. And I must say to this intelligent audience, that I can but feel sorry that my beloved brother, with the natural sagacity which I award to him, has found it in his heart to deny this proposition. I am astonished at the start, but he may remove that astonishment by arguments that are convincing; but this remains to be seen.
The first argument we shall offer upon this point will be founded on the organization of man. Now, permit me to remark, that the question between Elder Hume and myself is one of the utmost importance. There are but two sides to it. Either man is capable of acting or choosing, or else he is not. Now, I ask if he is not a moral agent, endowed with volition or free will, what is he? What kind of character will we give to him? The decision that my mind arrives at is this: either he is a moral agent, endowed, as the proposition says, with this power of choosing or refusing, or he is a mere machine. With this thought we approach the argument. We will first make a few remarks respecting man's organization. He is represented in the Bible as being composed of moral and physical powers; or, in other words, of soul and body. Our investigation will be principally with regard to his moral powers; and here we will attempt to learn a lesson upon the dealings of God with men. When a man is perfectly acquainted with the capacity of anything about him, either animate or inanimate, he is apt to govern his conduct in that direction by the known ability possessed by the subject. Allowing this rule to be correct, let us endeavor to find the object of God's dealings with man after his creation, and see whether those dealings presuppose the existence of this moral power. First, when he was made and placed in the garden God calls him good. He was made in God's image--not physically, but the moral image of God was impressed upon him. Now, we undertake to say this was his moral power; for there is no likeness, on earth or in heaven, of God, that can be physical for he is unapproachable to look upon, being immortal. We will search for the image of God, then, in man, so far as his governing powers are concerned. God made man for a governor, a ruler. Ruling power was given to him over all the animals and over all creatures on earth. In order for man to be a governor, God must have endowed him with the power of governing. This could not exist in the absence of the power to act or not act, or the volition of the will, which is the same thing. But that God did recognize these qualities in man, will appear from the first declaration made to him in the giving of the law: "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest eat, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it, for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." The Apostle Paul says the law was holy, the commandment holy, just and good. A just commandment, delivered with a perfect knowledge of the powers of the subject of that commandment, could not require anything more in the commandment than he had power or ability to obey. This fact proves that God recognized in Adam the power to act or not to act--the power to do or not to do, which is what we claim in our proposition. Here we see man in his organization exhibited clearly, showing that he did possess this power. My opponent will doubtless endeavor to show that he did not. Then, I say, there can be no justice in the commandment. Having shown this at the earliest point, let us see whether he will deny or recognize him in possession of these powers. If not, we may succeed in convincing even Brother Hume that man possessed them at the start; yet he may attempt to show that he lost them by the fall. Let us follow the thread of the argument. After the fall God had a conversation with Adam. In that conversation he does not speak of having lost any of the moral faculties of his mind, but having sinned against God--of having made a wrong use of his power. But I will here pass from Adam and select a bad subject. We will bring you to the first bad man, Cain, the murderer. He is a true representative, having lost the knowledge and the enjoyment of God, was corrupt, base and fallen. We will venture to say that, so far as the fall is concerned, it is as prominent in him as in any character we could select. He had committed murder; and after that murder God talks to him; and this leads to the irresistible conclusion that God knew Cain could understand him. If Cain had never acted as a moral agent, in this interview he might have pleaded that his conduct was not from any consent of his will or moral power.
But, mark, no such plea is made. After having conversed with him and pronounced judgment upon him for his crime, Cain complains of his hard lot, saying that it was more than he was able to bear. In reply God says to him, "If thou doest well shalt not thou be accepted." Mark, this is God's talk. Would God have said this in the absence of Cain's possessing ability to do well? Would God have used insincere language? Would God have said, "If thou doest well shalt not thou be accepted," yet knowing the impossibility of his doing well? No, O no! Let us not put such a stain upon Jehovah's character. God made this declaration with a full knowledge that he was capable of doing well and obeying him. Otherwise, then sin lieth not at the door.
We will pass on and see, if we can, whether this audience possesses moral agency or freedom of the will. But I must acknowledge that in attempting to prove this it looks to me, from the standpoint I occupy, like trying to prove to you a fact which every one not only believes but positively knows. I take this position, that from a knowledge of this fact arises all our convictions of right and wrong. Virtue is attached to obedience and guilt to disobedience; but neither praise nor blame can justly attach to a being, in heaven or on earth, that is not in possession of these powers. Take, for instance, the man under conviction of having done wrong, and we are daily met by such men. It is true that man is frequently very sorry for having done a wrong act, or for neglecting to do that which was right. I appeal to the understanding of the audience before me, and ask, is not man subject to this feeling; does he not often weep in penitence and tears, for having done an act or for not doing what was commanded? He feels guilt, and justly, for having acted contrary to God's law. Guilt is fastened on his conscience and his soul.
Now, I say that this feeling never could enter a man's soul, only upon the conviction that he might have acted otherwise. Convince a man that all his conduct and his actions are unavoidable, and is there a man under the canopy of heaven that could consistently be sorry for doing a thing he could not avoid doing? A man may be sorry for an accident, for an unavoidable act, but he can never feel criminally guilty for an act over which he had no control. The will, then, must act; the agency must exist; the consciousness of having a power to act must be felt; otherwise, his conscience would not, like a worm, gnaw the sinner under a sense of his guilt. The pains of damnation of the flames of hell's torch could never produce suffering where there could have been no possibility of avoiding the act by which they were consigned there. Take the rich man's case. It is in point. He indirectly gives us the reason why he is there; for, in his prayer, he desires his five brothers to be warned, "peradventure they will repent;" which I understand to mean, if I had repented, I would not have been here. Does not the very character of this case teach us that all his anguish flowed from a consciousness that he might have avoided that place? I say this case is a positive proof, and it stands up as a beacon on the stormy coast of time--as a beacon to others to choose eternal life. We see he wanted his five brothers warned, that they might repent, and thereby escape the damnation of hell. No such desire would ever have existed in the heart of the poor hell-scorched sinner, if he had not been a moral agent--if he had not had moral power. Having introduced these points, I now appeal to this audience, and ask you, as ladies and gentlemen, would it be possible for you to feel condemnation for acts you could not avoid? And if you could avoid it, then you are moral free agents, possessing free will.
We will now introduce a few passages of scripture, which I think are in point. Some of them may refer to the freedom of the will; others to the moral agency of man; but I think they all bear upon one of the two. First, then, to Leviticus i, 3: "If his offering be a burnt-sacrifice of the herd, let him offer a male without blemish: he shall offer it of his own VOLUNTARY WILL, at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, before the Lord." etc. Here under the law of Moses, we see it stated, and this is God's language, that he must offer it of his own voluntary will. Could he do this unless he had the endowment of free will? Your answer is no. Again, see Lev. xix, 5: "And if ye offer a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord, ye shall offer it at your own will." Here the will is introduced, and the sacrifice is to be voluntary. Now, to be voluntary implies that if a man had not his will in that direction, such sacrifice would be rejected. Turn to 1 Cor. vii, 37: "Nevertheless, he that standeth steadfast in his heart, having no necessity, but hath power over his own will, and hath so decreed in his heart," etc. Power over his own will! Paul, did you think that man had power over his will? Did the immortal Paul recognize the existence of that power? If he did not, then his language does not convey that meaning. Again, Luke xii, 47: "And that servant, which knew his lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes." How many stripes would he have been subject to if he had not known his lord's will? Again, see John's Gospel v, 40: "And ye will not come to me that ye might have life." Here we raise the supposition that man had the power to will and come; but they would not come; they staid away voluntarily; they failed to obtain life by the exercise of the freedom of the will. Rev. xxii, 17 --one of the most familiar of passages-- "And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely." We take this as evidence that the words "whosoever will" are to be understood as meaning that all may exercise the judgment and power to come in that direction. The will is necessary in order to drink of the water of life. Now, to Joshua xxiv, 15: "And if it seem evil unto you to serve the Lord, choose you this day whom ye will serve," etc. Here comes up the last point in our proposition, almost asserting that he has the power of choosing. Would Joshua have used this language if they could not do it? Was Joshua mistaken in the character of the people, or were the people destitute of moral agency and freedom of the will? Yet Joshua tells them to choose this day whom they will serve. In the absence of the power of volition, no man ever did make a choice, neither can he. It is simply impossible for a man to choose in the absence of the volition of the will. Luke x, 47: "And Mary hath chosen that good part, which shall not be taken away from her." Is this true? Jesus says it is true. He says Mary hath chosen that good part. Could she have done it in the absence of free will? Could she have done it in the absence of the ability to choose or reject between two propositions? You all would answer, no. Then the fact of Mary having exercised volition of will, which she did do, I regard at least as being evidence that it exists in man. I will refer you to another text, which you will find in Heb. xi, 25, where it is said of Moses, "Choosing rather to suffer affliction with the people of God than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season." This is perhaps a case more in point than any we have had before; for here are two propositions presented to the mind of Moses: the pleasures of sin, or the reproaches and affliction of the people of God. Moses is capable of examining and turning these points over and over, of looking at them, of deciding and of choosing the one and rejecting the other. None will question this fact as it regards Moses; and with regard to Mary, none will question that; so with regard to the people of Israel, that Joshua told to choose whom they will serve. But we will quote another text, without giving chapter and verse. I allude now to the language used, if I mistake not, in connection with Elijah, the prophet: "Why halt ye between two opinions: if the Lord be God, serve him; if Baal, serve him." Here you discover the facts prominently set forth, that the speaker seems to be astonished that they hesitated between two opinions, when they could reject one and choose the other. We are contending now for the volition of the will, the power of choosing. The same truth shines in the dealings of God with the human race, on, on, down the stream of time, and prominently shows itself in the day of judgment. I will quote another text. God says: "He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned." Now, the question arises whether there is the power anywhere in man to believe when the evidence is presented before his eyes. This is a question upon which hang weighty and eternal things. I do not like to affirm in my own language, but I have a text which I consider pertinent: "With the heart, man believeth unto righteousness; with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation." Does man believe with the heart? Can he believe with his heart? If he does or can, then he has the power and will to believe. This view brings his condemnation upon him justly, for not doing that which he might have done, and for doing that which he might have avoided. Upon this great principle of justice, God deals with man in all his commandments, in all his judgments. In punishing him, he punishes him for doing what he might have done. He rewards him for doing what he was commanded to do. And the very fact of his doing so shows plainly that man has the volition of free will, and the truth of the proposition is sustained; and man never could have obeyed if he did not possess the power to obey. I repeat, could he obey without power to obey? Could he have been condemned for unbelief when he had no power to believe? Your answer must be no.
(Time expired.)
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